










































<em>Dyson</em> and <em>Samsung</em> Compared
Citation for published version:
Cornwell, J 2013, 'Dyson and Samsung Compared: Functionality and Aesthetics in the Design Infringement
Analysis' European Intellectual Property Review, vol 35, no. 5, pp. 273-86.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Published In:
European Intellectual Property Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version of Record, has
been published in the European Intellectual Property Review (2013), 35,5, p.273-286. © Sweet & Maxwell.
Cornwell, J. (2013). Dyson and Samsung Compared: Functionality and Aesthetics in the Design Infringement
Analysis. European Intellectual Property Review, 35(5), 273-86.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
1 
Dyson and Samsung  compared – functionality and aesthetics in the design infringement analysis 
 
Jane Cornwell, Lecturer in Intellectual Property Law, University of  Edinburgh      
School of  Law, University of  Edinburgh, Old College, South Bridge Edinburgh EH8 9YL  




How far to protect functionally-influenced designs is a critical question in design law. Comparison of  two leading UK 
infringement disputes, Dyson v Vax and Samsung v Apple, reveals how apparent reluctance to grant protection to such 
designs in Dyson has now given way in Samsung to a greater receptiveness towards functionally-influenced designs which is 
more aligned to the European design regime. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Introduction  
The extent to which design laws should protect functional or semi-functional design is longstanding and 
controversial question. 1 Divergences across Member States’ national laws were to be addressed in the 
harmonised European design regime enacted by the Designs Directive (‘DD’) and Community Design 
Regulation (‘CDR’). 2 The European regime adopted a new ‘design approach’, marked among other key 
features by its inclusion of  both the functional and the aesthetic in the definition of  ‘design’.  Despite 
this, however, the debate over protection of  functionally-influenced design in Europe remains very much 
alive.  
The main focus of  this debate since enactment of  the European regime has been on interpretation of  the 
exclusion from protection for design features ‘solely dictated by… technical function’ at Articles 7(1) DD 
and 8(1) CDR.  It is, however, clear that a very great many functionally-influenced designs will survive this 
exclusion, whatever interpretation is preferred. 3 The aim of  the European regime was clearly to provide 
some measure of  protection for such designs. 4 But how much? In particular, how should functionally-
influenced designs be treated when approaching the comparison with potentially conflicting other 
designs?  
This issue, which has been much less examined and debated than the Article 7(1)/8(1) exclusion, is the 
focus of  analysis in this article. This article compares the treatment of  functionally-influenced designs in 
the infringement analysis in two leading UK cases, Dyson Limited v Vax Limited and Samsung Electronics (UK) 
Limited v Apple Inc. 5  Both involved high-profile litigants seeking to protect designs at the cutting-edge of  
style and technology. Both also show how tensions surrounding functionally-influenced design are 
coming into increasingly sharp focus in the developing infringement case law.  The comparison between 
these cases reveals a degree of  apparent reluctance on the part of  the English High Court and Court of  
Appeal in Dyson to attribute weight to functionally-influenced design features in the assessment of  
infringement. However, in Samsung this has given way to a more nuanced view of  the design process in 
which the English High Court looked more closely and with greater consideration at the balancing of  
functional requirements and aesthetic freedom. As a result, in Samsung design features were less readily 
dismissed from the infringement analysis because of  their functional influences. This outcome has been 
upheld by the English Court of  Appeal in its recent dismissal of  Apple’s appeal against the first instance 
finding of  non-infringement. It will be argued that the more rounded approach to functionally-influenced 
design in Samsung is better aligned with the aims of  the European design regime.  
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Background: the European design regime and the role of  the concept of  ‘design freedom’ in 
moderating the protection of  functionally-influenced designs  
The definition of  ‘design’ in the DD and CDR focuses on one key factor - the ‘appearance’ of  the whole 
or part of  a product: 
‘‘[D]esign’ means the appearance of  the whole or part of  a product resulting from the features 
of, in particular, the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials of  the product itself  
and/or its ornamentation’.6 
A ‘product’ can be ‘any industrial or handicraft item’.7  The definition of  ‘design’ – containing, as it does, 
no reference to either the aesthetic or the functional - was described at the time that the new regime was 
working its way towards enactment as ‘arguably the most important contribution that the proposals make 
to the advancement of  design protection laws’, the European Commission having ‘repudiat[ed]’ the 
problematic ‘functional/aesthetic dichotomy’. 8  
In the European design regime, the tests of  novelty and individual character are now the principal 
requirements governing entitlement to protection. A design is ‘new’ if  no ‘identical design’ has been made 
available to the public before the relevant date, designs being deemed to be identical if  ‘their features 
differ only in immaterial details’; a design has ‘individual character’ if  ‘the overall impression it produces 
on the informed user differs from the overall impression produced on such a user by any design which 
has been made available to the public’ before the relevant date.9  The scope of  protection conferred upon 
a design by the European regime is also dependent on the concept of  ‘overall impression’, a protected 
design being infringed by any design which does not produce on the informed user a different overall 
impression.10  None of  the concepts of  novelty, individual character or overall impression are defined in 
terms of  aesthetics or functionality.11  
This basic position is subject to two caveats as regards functionally-influenced designs. The first is the 
exclusion from protection of  design features ‘solely dictated by… technical function’ at Articles 7(1) DD 
and 8(1) CDR. Article 7(1) DD provides: 
‘A design right shall not subsist in features of  appearance of  a product which are solely dictated 
by its technical function’.  
As noted in the early literature, this exclusion gave rise to an immediate tension in terms of  the apparent 
intention of  the Commission to protect both functional and aesthetic designs.12 Articles 7(1) DD and 
8(1) CDR also employ language which is notoriously unclear.13 This has been problematic, but is not the 
main focus of  this article which is concerned instead with the second particular issue for functional 
designs, relating to the treatment of  functionally-influenced design features in the comparison of 
conflicting designs for validity and infringement purposes. Whatever interpretation of Articles 7(1) DD 
and 8(1) CDR is preferred, this has the potential to affect a far greater number of functionally-influenced 
designs than the Article 7(1) / 8(1) exclusion. 
In the comparison of conflicting designs, the debate over the extent of protection to be afforded to 
functionally-influenced design finds its outlet ‘indirectly’ in the requirement in Articles 5(2) and 9(2) DD 
and Articles 6(2) and 10(2) CDR that the ‘degree of freedom of the designer’ must be ‘taken into 
consideration’ when assessing the individual character of a design for validity purposes and its scope of 
protection against infringement. 14  For infringement purposes, Articles 9(2) DD and 10(2) CDR state: 
‘In assessing the scope of protection, the degree of freedom of the designer in developing his 
design shall be taken into consideration’. 
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There is, however, no substantive difference between taking design freedom into account for the 
purposes of assessing validity or for assessing scope of protection.15 
The proper application of  the ‘design freedom’ test was identified in early literature as essential to the 
success of  the new ‘design approach’ of  the DD and CDR. 16  The exercise of  ascribing greater or lesser 
significance to the different features of  a design is key to building up a picture of  the ‘overall impression’ 
produced on the informed user, this being the core legal concept underpinning the DD and CDR for 
validity and infringement purposes. 17 Taking ‘design freedom’ into account reflects the fact that product 
designers operate within constraints which artists do not. 18 Some of  those constraints will affect how the 
informed user perceives similarities and differences between designs.  The balance between the weight 
attributed to design features affected by some form of  restriction on design freedom and the weight to be 
attributed to features where there is none determines whether and, if  so, how far the European regime 
favours more aesthetic or more functional designs.  
The recitals to the DD and CDR state that ‘design freedom’ is to be taken into consideration alongside 
the nature of  the product to which the design is applied and the industrial sector to which it belongs, as 
part of  assessing the overall impression of  a design relative to the existing design corpus. 19  Beyond this, 
however, the DD and CDR give no further guidance on ‘design freedom’.  What types of  factor are 
relevant? Technical matters only or matters such as cost, efficiency or market acceptability? How should 
the relevant factors be ‘taken into consideration’? And how much of  an impact on design freedom does 
there need to be to affect the informed user’s perception of  overall impression?  
General Court case law on ‘design freedom’: Grupo Promer and Shenzhen 
The assessment of  ‘overall impression’ has been the subject of  a number of  appeals from decisions of  
OHIM to the General Court and, in two instances, from there to the Court of  Justice. These cases deal 
with a range of  important matters, including the legal characterisation of  the ‘informed user’ and other 
matters which are outwith the scope of  this article. 20 On the specific issue of  ‘design freedom’ which is 
the focus here, the key authorities are the judgments of  the General Court in Grupo Promer Mon Graphic 
SA v OHIM and Shenzhen v OHIM. 21   
Grupo Promer was the first case to reach the General Court under the new European design regime. It 
arose from an invalidity challenge to a Community registered design belonging to PepsiCo, Inc. relating to 
children’s toys called ‘pogs’, ‘tazos’ or ‘rappers’. These consist of  small, round, metal discs and are often 
distributed as free gifts inside other products. OHIM’s Invalidity Division had declared PepsiCo’s 
Community registered design invalid because of  its conflict with an earlier design belonging to the 
challenger, Grupo Promer – see Figures 1 and 2 below: 22 




Figure 2 – Grupo Promer’s prior design: 
 
This decision was reversed by the OHIM Third Board of  Appeal, which upheld the Community 
registered design, and the case was thereafter appealed by Grupo Promer to the General Court. The key 
issue was whether the PepsiCo and Grupo Promer designs produced the same overall impression on the 
informed user and, as a sub-question, whether and, if  so, how that overall impression was impacted by 
taking into account design freedom. In dealing with these issues, the General Court gave guidance 
relevant to some of  the questions on design freedom noted above as arising from the lack of  detailed 
guidance in the DD and CDR.  
In Grupo Promer, the General Court looked first at the type of  factor relevant to design freedom, holding 
that: 
‘… the designer’s degree of  freedom in developing his design is established, inter alia, by the 
constraints of  the features imposed by the technical function of  the product or an element 
thereof, or by statutory requirements applicable to the product. Those constraints result in a 
standardisation of  certain features, which will thus be common to the designs applied to the 
product concerned’. 23 
The General Court also explained how the degree of  design freedom affects assessment of  overall 
impression. It held: 
‘In the specific assessment of  the overall impression of  the designs at issue on the informed user, 
who has some awareness of  the state of  the prior art, the designer’s degree of  freedom in 
developing the contested design must be taken into account… [I]n so far as similarities between 
the designs at issue relate to common features such as those described [above], those similarities 
will have only minor importance in the overall impression produced by those designs on the 
informed user. In addition, the more the designer’s freedom in developing the design is restricted, 
the more likely minor differences between the designs at issue will be sufficient to produce a 
different overall impression on the informed user’. 24 
For reasons which will be addressed further below, on the facts the General Court upheld the Board of  
Appeal’s conclusion that design freedom was ‘severely restricted’; however, taking that into account when 
comparing the designs in suit, the General Court reached the opposite conclusion on validity, concluding 
that the PepsiCo design did not produce a different overall impression to the earlier Grupo Promer 
design and that PepsiCo’s Community design registration was therefore invalid.25  
Shenzhen was the second design case to reach the General Court on the assessment of  ‘overall impression’. 




On appeal to the General Court, the owner of  the Community registered design argued that many design 
features – such as the speaker, microphone, control buttons and screen - and their configuration in the 
unit were dictated by the technical function of  the device and that design freedom was in any event also 
constrained by a general trend favouring small, flat, rectangular devices such as that depicted in the 
registration.26 However, the General Court held that that a ‘general trend’ is not a relevant factor to be 
taken into account when assessing design freedom.27  The General Court also distinguished between a 
need for certain features to be generally present, which did not amount to a constraint on design freedom, 
and a need governing the actual specific appearance of  the designs in suit, which is a relevant constraint: 
on the facts, while the General Court accepted that the speaker, microphone, control buttons and screen 
were needed in the device, that concerned only the presence of  those features in the unit and did not 
have a significant impact on their configuration or on the form and general appearance of  the unit itself.28 
On the facts, the General Court held that the degree of  freedom of  the designer of  conference units was 
relatively wide and, after comparing the designs in suit, concluded that the designs produced the same 
overall impression and that the Community registered design was therefore invalid.29 
These rulings undoubtedly give some assistance to national courts on how to incorporate assessment of  
‘design freedom’ into their infringement analysis, although a number of  uncertainties remain, particularly 
arising from the General Court’s application of  its legal ruling to the facts in Grupo Promer. 30  These, and 
other matters, have been explored in the two UK cases, Dyson v Vax and Samsung v Apple, to which this 
article now turns. 
Dyson v Vax – design freedom constrained 
This case concerned alleged infringement of  a UK registered design relating to Dyson’s award-winning 
DC02 multi-stage bag-free cyclonic vacuum cleaner by a competing cyclonic vacuum cleaner called the 
‘Mach Zen’. Images from Dyson’s UK design registration and corresponding views of  the ‘Mach Zen’ are 
at Figures 3 and 4 below: 31  
 




Figure 4 – corresponding views of  the ‘Mach Zen’: 
 
There was no challenge to the validity as such of  Dyson’s design, 32 although Vax did argue that the 
transparent dirt-collecting bin forming part of  Dyson’s registered design, a concept also present in Vax’s 
‘Mach Zen’, was excluded from protection under Article 7(1) DD as ‘solely dictated by… technical 
function’. In dealing with this argument, perhaps unexpectedly Arnold J at first instance favoured an 
interpretation of  Article 7(1) DD in which the exclusion was not determined by the availability of  
alternative designs capable of  fulfilling the same function, as had been thought by many to be the correct 
approach, but instead by whether the design of  the feature in question was attributable solely to 
functional considerations. 33  On the evidence, that challenge failed. 34  While Arnold J’s preferred 
interpretation of  Article 7(1) DD has implications discussed further below, the potentially more difficult 
and less examined issue in Dyson lies in the approach at first instance and on appeal to the assessment of  
‘design freedom’ in the infringement analysis. 
Although stressing the importance of  overall impression, Dyson identified nine particular respects in 
which it contended that the ‘Mach Zen’ was similar to its registered design:  
• its collecting bin, inclined at ‘substantially halfway’ between vertical and horizontal; 
• the transparency of  that bin, with the cyclone mechanism visible through it; 
• the presence of  a pair of  co-axial wheels at the rear of  the machine, oversized so that they 
extended to ‘approximately half  the height of  the body of  the machine’; 
• the spacing apart of  the wheels ‘to define the widest part of  the machine’;  
• prominent wheel arches extending over the top of  the wheels, part of  each formed by an 
elongated operational button; 
• its cyclone top, increasing in height towards the rear of  the machine; 
• a lower bin support, said to form a ‘sweeping and curved’ forward extension of  the wheel arches;  
• a long ‘arcuate’ (i.e. curved) handle said to ‘sweep’ from above the bin to the rear of  the machine 
above and behind the wheel overarching the cyclone top; and 
7 
• a body portion sloping downwards from the cyclone top towards the rear of  the machine.35 
 
At first instance, Arnold J drew from some aspects of  the General Court judgments quoted above on 
‘design freedom’ and also made his own findings on various issues. 36 Arnold J held that relevant 
constraints on design freedom were the technical function of  the product or an element thereof, the need 
to incorporate features common to the relevant products and economic considerations; he also added, 
after hearing argument from the parties, that the technical specification of  the product (for example, 
whether a high-performance or low-performance device) was also a relevant constraint. 37  
On the facts, Arnold J found that all but two of  the design features highlighted by Dyson (the lower bin 
support, held not to be present in the ‘Mach Zen’ at all, and the curved shape of  the longitudinal handle) 
were restricted to such a degree as to greatly reduce their significance in the eyes of  the informed user.38  
For example, the orientation of  the parties’ collecting bins half  way between horizontal and vertical was 
held to be ‘not of  great significance’ to the informed user because, although common ground that it was 
possible to orient a multi-cyclone separator at any angle, the ‘trade-off ’ between a vertical and a 
horizontal orientation ‘favoured’ an angle of  ‘around’ 45 degrees and design freedom was therefore 
constrained if  the designer wanted to achieve the ‘best technical compromise’.39  The transparency of  the 
bin was also ‘not of  great significance’ because, although common ground that there were other possible 
solutions which would allow the user to know when the bin was full (such as a window, tinted bin or 
indicator), such alternatives had ‘drawbacks’ with ‘ease of  use and cost considerations’ both ‘point[ing]’ 
towards adoption of  a transparent bin. Thus, design freedom was restricted if  the designer wished to 
achieve ‘the best solution’.40 
Similar conclusions were reached in relation to remaining features highlighted by Dyson. Although 
accepted by both sides as not necessary to have large rear wheels, their presence in both designs was not 
of  great significance to the informed user because there was ‘an advantage’ to having a pair of  large 
wheels and ‘an advantage’ to situating them close to the motor at the rear of  the machine.41  The 
positioning of  the wheels was also restricted in that spacing them apart was ‘advantageous’ for stability 
reasons.42 The prominence of  the wheel arches resulted from a need to prevent debris falling into the 
wheel mechanism and because the arches were ‘bound to have some prominence’ as a result of  the size 
of  the wheels themselves.43  The operational buttons forming part of  the wheel arches were restricted by 
a need to have these in the product and because it was ‘desirable, although not necessary’ to locate them 
as in the Dyson design/‘Mach Zen’, it being common in the design corpus for such buttons to be at the 
rear of  the machine.44  The design of  the cyclone top was restricted in following the air path between the 
cyclone and the motor.45  The sloping configuration of  the body portion was restricted because it was 
‘technically sensible’ to follow the same line as the air ducts, building up the housing in a different way 
being liable to take up ‘unnecessary space and material’.46   Although common ground that the handle did 
not have to be centrally or longitudinally positioned, this also reflected a design restriction because it was 
‘advantageous’ in terms of  ease of  carrying.47 
A number of  differences in appearance, some of  which Arnold J regarded as considerable, were also 
stressed throughout the judgment in relation to several of  the features relied upon by Dyson.48 Arnold J 
also identified number of  further visual differences between the ‘Mach Zen’ and registered design, some 
of  which he regarded as striking.49  In conclusion, ‘standing back’ from the detail and taking into account 
the design corpus and his views on design constraints, Arnold J held that the ‘Mach Zen’ produced a 
different overall impression to Dyson’s registered design, the former being ‘rugged, angular and industrial, 
even somewhat brutal’ while the latter was ‘smooth, curving and elegant’; as a result, even allowing that 
Dyson’s design was entitled to a ‘fairly broad scope of  protection’ because of  the differences between it 
and the prior art, the ‘Mach Zen’ did not infringe.50 
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In the Court of  Appeal, Dyson challenged Arnold J’s conclusion that the ‘Mach Zen’ produced a 
different overall impression to its registered design. 51  Much of  the argument focussed on Arnold J’s 
approach to ‘design freedom’. Dyson argued that the judge’s approach had, in effect, been to find 
restrictions on design freedom and to discount the key similarities in the ‘Mach Zen’ because Dyson’s 
design represented a ‘particularly good compromise’ such that any departure from it would adversely 
affect the product in some way; the net effect of  such an approach was, as senior counsel for Dyson put 
it, ‘the better your design… the less design freedom, and the narrower your protection’.52 However, giving 
the main judgment of  the Court of  Appeal, Sir Robin Jacob found no error of  principle in Arnold J’s 
approach. Instead, according to Sir Robin Jacob, for all of  the common features in relation to which 
design freedom had been an issue, Arnold J had correctly considered ‘to what extent they had technical 
significance and thus affected the degree of  design freedom’ and had found on the evidence that there 
was ‘a technical reason’ for each of  them.53  In any event, highlighting the differences in appearance 
between the designs and criticising the list of  common design features relied upon by Dyson as ‘far too 
general’, Sir Robin Jacob noted that he also would have concluded that the ‘Mach Zen’ produced a 
different overall impression had he been free to form and substitute his own opinion; he noted that this 
would have been his conclusion even making an allowance for greater weight to be given to the features 
identified by Arnold J as functionally constrained.54  
Samsung v Apple  - design freedom retained 
Only a matter of  months after the Court of  Appeal’s judgment in Dyson, the issues surrounding design 
freedom came to the fore again in the English Samsung v Apple litigation. This very high-profile dispute 
concerned a Community design registration comprising a series of  line-drawing views of, in essence, the 
Apple iPad.55 Apple’s Community design was alleged to be infringed by three of  Samsung’s ‘Galaxy’ tablet 
computers, the 10.1, 8.9 and 7.7. Images from Apple’s Community design registration and views of  
Samsung’s ‘Galaxy’ 10.1 are at Figures 5 and 6 below: 56 
Figure 5 – images from Apple’s Community design registration: 
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Figure 6 – images of  the Samsung ‘Galaxy’ 10.1: 
          
 
Although Samsung’s products have been the subject of  parallel litigation in a number of  Member States, 
the judgment of  the English High Court was the first full substantive national court decision on 
infringement in the EU.57  With a challenge to the validity of  Apple’s design outstanding before OHIM, 
the case did not assess the entitlement of  Apple’s design to protection as such nor was any objection 
raised to Apple’s design under Article 8(1) CDR, although His Honour Judge Birss QC took the 
opportunity to express his agreement¸ obiter, with the interpretation of  the exclusion for designs ‘solely 
dictated … by technical function’ adopted by Arnold J in Dyson. 58    
Apple identified seven common features in its design and the Samsung devices which it argued gave rise 
to infringement, namely their: 
• shapes as ‘broadly rectangular, bi-axially symmetrical slabs’ with four ‘evenly, slightly rounded’ 
corners; 
• flat transparent surfaces ‘without any ornamentation’ covering the entire front face of  the devices 
up to the rim; 
• very thin rims ‘of  constant width’, ‘surrounding and flush with’ the front transparent surface; 
• rectangular display screens surrounded by a plain border ‘of  generally constant width’ centred 
beneath the transparent surface;  
• substantially flat rear surfaces which curved upwards at the sides and came to meet the front 
surface at a ‘crisp outer edge’; 
• thin profiles, the impression of  which was emphasised by the above; and 
• overall, designs of  ‘extreme simplicity’ without features specifying orientation.59  
 
As well as highlighting a number of  differences in appearance between its devices and the Community 
design, Samsung cited an extensive body of  prior art which it said was close to and reduced the impact of  
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similarities between its devices and the Apple design.60 Samsung also argued that there was very limited 
design freedom.61 
There was some dispute between the parties as to the range of  factors which could be taken into account 
as design constraints (for example, whether economic considerations were relevant as held in Dyson), but 
Judge Birss held that he did not need to decide the issue and the only constraints considered by him were 
functional ones. 62 On the facts, Judge Birss rejected Samsung’s arguments on design freedom for 
essentially all features in dispute.   
For example, noting that the rectangular and bi-axially symmetrical ‘slab’ shape was ‘to a large extent’ 
driven by the function of  using a rectangular screen, Judge Birss held that designers nonetheless had a 
‘fair degree’ of  design freedom and ‘an important aspect’ of  the exercise of  that freedom related to 
aesthetics.63  In respect of  the products’ rounded corners, while noting Samsung’s evidence that rounded 
corners were preferred for manufacturing and ergonomic reasons and that their dimensions were 
influenced by factors relating to the size and volume of  the device, Judge Birss held that the degree of  
rounding on devices in the design corpus differed substantially and that the considerations of  volume, 
display size and ergonomics were simply trade-offs which illustrated the design choices which the 
designer would have to make, the appearance of  the product playing ‘an important part of  that process 
of  choice’.64  Other than the rectangular display screen itself  which was ‘banal and determined solely by 
function’, such design constraints as there were could not account for the identity between the Apple 
design and Samsung devices.65 
Judge Birss reached similar conclusions in relation to the other features highlighted by Apple. While the 
screen had to be transparent and design freedom was constrained in so far as all displays had a border of  
some sort, there were no constraints requiring the designer to do away with a bezel completely as had 
been done by both Apple and Samsung nor any constraints dictating the extent of  ornamentation on the 
front of  the device. Aesthetics ‘play[ed] a part’ in the choice of  border feature; the degree of  
ornamentation on the front of  the device was also ‘a matter of  the designer[’s] choice’ with ‘functional 
trade-offs to consider but… also aesthetic considerations’.  While there were ‘modest’ design constraints 
in relation to the configuration of  the front surface, they therefore did not account for the close similarity 
between the Samsung tablets and the Apple design.66  The same was true of  the rim: within a ‘general 
overall constraint’ requiring a rim of  some sort, the designer had ‘significant aesthetic design freedom’ to 
choose, in a trade-off  involving functional and aesthetic considerations, between a bezel or flush rim and 
to choose the rim thickness and configuration around the device.  Again, the identity between the 
Samsung device and Apple design was not a result of  design constraints.67   
Even where design freedom was ‘considerably’ constrained in terms of  the need for some sort of  touch-
insensitive border around the screen, that alone did not account for the similarity between the Samsung 
devices and the Apple design.68  As for the rear surface and curved sides of  the devices, there was only 
one serious design constraint – the need for the back to be generally flat – otherwise there was 
‘considerable design freedom’, the curved sides in particular being ‘almost entirely aesthetic’ despite their 
effects on technical matters such as the internal volume of  the device.69  As regards the profile of  the 
devices, while it was accepted that designers of  handheld computers with screens of  this size were 
constrained to make their products ‘relatively thin’, this included ‘a wide range of  actual thicknesses’.70  
There was also no functional constraint forcing designers to make extremely simple, featureless designs or 
requiring a design without features specifying orientation.71 
In short, although various constraints on ‘design freedom’ were recognised by Judge Birss, none was 
sufficient to explain the identity or similarity between the Apple and Samsung designs. Nonetheless, the 
infringement claim failed because of  the similarity of  Apple’s design to the existing design corpus. As a 
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result, the identity or close similarity of  the common features in the Samsung devices was reduced in 
significance.72  Conversely, differences in design – Samsung’s devices being much thinner and having 
unusual detailing on the rear – had greater prominence in the eyes of  the informed user.73  Overall, Judge 
Birss concluded that, while from the front the Apple and Samsung devices appeared to be members of  
the same ‘family’ of  designs, the Samsung device was very thin, ‘almost insubstantial’ with ‘unusual 
details’ on the back; Apple’s design was ‘a cool design’, but Samsung’s devices were ‘not as cool’.74   
Lacking the same ‘understated and extreme simplicity’ of  the Apple design, their overall impression was 
different and the Samsung devices did not infringe.75 
After the ruling by Judge Birss, the dispute rapidly came before the English Court of  Appeal which issued 
its decision just over three months later. On appeal, the focus of  argument turned on the informed user’s 
perception of  the designs and the assessment of  overall impression.76 Apple criticised Judge Birss for 
having approached the design corpus wrongly and for failing properly to consider the designs as a whole, 
with too much of  a feature-by-feature comparison. 77  These arguments were rejected by the Court of  
Appeal, which found no error of  principle in Judge Birss’ approach; indeed, as in Dyson, giving the main 
judgment on behalf  of  the Court, Sir Robin Jacob noted he would have reached the same conclusion on 
overall impression as the judge at first instance were he required to form his own view.78  No particular 
complaints were levelled at Judge Birss’ approach to design freedom and his findings on this issue were 
upheld.79 
Dyson and Samsung  compared – two different approaches to ‘design freedom’ 
In high-level terms, the courts in Dyson and Samsung approached the assessment of  overall impression the 
same way. Judge Birss in Samsung articulated his approach the most clearly. He stressed that the outcome 
of  the infringement claim depended on overall impression. However, as a practical matter the designs in 
suit had to be broken down into features in order to give each feature ‘appropriate significance or weight’ 
in a three-step process: first, disregarding the feature completely if  dictated solely by function, then 
considering that feature against the design corpus and from the point of  view of  design freedom. 
Differences, as well as similarities, needed to be addressed in this way. Taking into account the similarities 
and differences appropriately weighted in terms of  their significance to the informed user, the court 
could then come to a view on overall impression. 80   
It is, however, notable that on the issue of  ‘design freedom’ Dyson and Samsung are almost polar opposites. 
In Dyson, all but one of  the common design features were held to be restricted in a way significantly 
affecting overall impression. In contrast, in Samsung, apart from the rectangular screens and flat backs of  
the devices, no design features were held to be constrained to a relevant degree. Closer comparison of  the 
first instance and Court of  Appeal judgments in Dyson on the one hand and the first instance judgment in 
Samsung on the other reveals significant divergence in their treatment of  the functionally-influenced 
elements of  the designs in suit. This was not remarked upon by the Court of  Appeal in the Samsung 
appeal. 
It must be stressed that the outcome in Dyson ultimately turned on the visual differences between the two 
designs. 81 However, it is submitted here that both Arnold J and the Court of  Appeal appear nonetheless 
to have misapplied the ‘design freedom’ test and were too ready to dismiss the common features 
highlighted by Dyson because of  their functional influences. As noted above, the Court of  Appeal held 
that Arnold J had, for each of  the features in suit, considered ‘to what extent they had technical 
significance and thus affected the degree of  design freedom’.82  It is, however, hard to locate any such 
assessment in the judgment at first instance, with no attempt by Arnold J to quantify the extent of  the 
impact of  the design constraints identified.83  
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The situation is not helped by the cursory way in which the first instance judgement addresses the parties’ 
evidence. 84 Dyson also did nothing to assist their case given the level of  generality at which some of  the 
relevant similarities were said to exist. 85  However, even where specifics were pleaded,  no consideration 
is given to them in the first instance judgment. For example, while it was held that the ‘favoured’ angle for 
orientation of  the transparent bin was ‘around’ 45 degrees, 86 there is no discussion by Arnold J of  the 
extent to which a deviation from that angle would result in inferior performance, what the reduction in 
performance would be, what were therefore the acceptable parameters for orienting the bin and thus 
what actually was the degree of  design freedom for this feature. Similarly, there is no explanation of  why 
the technical ‘advantages’ said to constrain the design of  the rear wheels required those wheels to have 
the specific proportions pleaded by Dyson (‘approximately half  the height of  the body of  the machine’), 
nor why the ‘advantages’ of  wide spacing required them to be positioned in either design in the exact way 
they were (‘defin[ing] the widest part of  the machine’). 87  There is no explanation of  why and how far the 
‘ease and cost considerations’ identified as constraints militating against configuring the collecting bin 
with a window or indicator led to, or were mitigated by, the adoption of  a fully transparent bin instead. It 
is only in relation to one feature that the relationship between constraint and design was considered, 
Arnold J conceding that constraints did ‘not dictate the precise shape of ’ the cyclone top. 88   
In other words, at no point in his judgment did Arnold J identify the actual degree of design freedom - the 
explicit requirement of  the DD and CDR – surrounding the design features in suit. There was 
consequently no assessment in his judgment of  how far the design restrictions which he held to exist in 
fact led to the specific design features in question.  This was not commented upon by the Court of  
Appeal.   
At the same time, it is striking to note the language used by both Arnold J and the Court of  Appeal in 
Dyson to describe the relevant design restrictions all of  which, it should be remembered, were accepted as 
impacting significantly on overall impression.  Arnold J accepted that such restrictions existed where a 
technical trade-off  or compromise ‘favour[ed]’ a particular design (or something ‘around’ that particular 
design), where alternatives to the design had ‘drawbacks’ which ‘point[ed] towards’ adoption of  the design 
in suit or which would have involved ‘unnecessary’ extra space or material, or even just where a particular 
feature was ‘advantageous’ , ‘desirable’ or technically ‘sensible’.89  The Court of  Appeal found it sufficient 
to justify the finding that each of  these design features was significantly diminished in terms of  overall 
impression that there was ‘a technical reason’ for designing each feature that way. 90 
In the Samsung case, ostensibly Judge Birss followed Dyson on the issue of  ‘design freedom’, noting the 
requirement, as stated by Sir Robin Jacob in the Court of  Appeal and quoted above, to consider for each 
design feature in suit ‘to what extent they had technical significance and thus affected the degree of  
design freedom’.91 However, thereafter Judge Birss developed his own, more refined approach.  
In particular, while there was (to use the language of  the Court of  Appeal in Dyson) a technical reason to 
design all of  the disputed features in Samsung a certain way, Judge Birss did not treat that alone as enough 
to impact on overall impression. Judge Birss emphasised that the issue is not simply a ‘binary question’ of  
whether or not a feature is dictated solely by function.92 Instead, the question is one of  weight: for any 
given feature, it is pertinent to know if  there are relevant technical considerations; where a feature could 
represent the product of  a mixture of  technical considerations and aesthetics, it is also relevant to know 
if  there are alternative ways of  designing the feature in question. According to Judge Birss, the balancing 
of  these factors is a key part of  the task of  assessing infringement.93 Adopting this approach and as is 
evident from the summary of  his findings above, as Judge Birss worked his way through the various 
design features in suit, he assessed more closely and explained more clearly the extent of  the relevant 
design constraints and thus how far those constraints could really be said to have caused any identity or 
similarity between the registered design and alleged infringements.94 It was as a result of  the rigour of  this 
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analysis that Samsung’s case on design freedom failed so roundly. This level of  analysis was, however, 
missing from Dyson both at first instance and on appeal. 
Samsung  preferred– restoring protection for functionally-influenced designs 
The judgment of  the General Court in Grupo Promer quoted earlier in this article, referring to ‘constraints’ 
which are ‘imposed by’ technical function or statutory requirements and which result in ‘standardisation’ 
of  features, clearly implies that a much higher degree of  design constraint than was accepted by the 
courts in Dyson is needed to affect overall impression. 95 This is supported by the Advocate-General’s 
Opinion in the Grupo Promer appeal to the Court of  Justice, in which he describes the ‘design freedom’ 
test as directed to situations of  ‘compulsory standardisation’ in which certain features of  a design are 
considered ‘mandatory’, design freedom needing to be taken into account in the assessment of  overall 
impression:  
‘because some features of  the product to which the design relates are, so to speak, “compulsory”: 
as a result, the designer is not free to change them…’ (emphasis added).96  
Similar language of  compulsion and necessity has been used in other General Court decisions.97  It is also 
clear from Shenzhen and other General Court judgements that there must be a causal link between any 
design constraint and the precise particular configuration of  the design in suit: without that all that is 
shown is that certain features must be present in the design in some way, but no more. 98 
It is respectfully suggested that, in Dyson, Arnold J and the Court of  Appeal did not properly reflect these 
principles in their approach to ‘design freedom’. It is, of  course, difficult fully to assess the correctness of  
the outcome in Dyson without a greater understanding of  the evidence before the court and the choice of  
language in both judgments may have been unfortunate. However, looked at in the round Dyson does 
seem to reveal a degree of  reluctance to grant much, if  any, protection to design features with functional 
or other practically-oriented influences. As well as the courts’ apparently relaxed approach to the actual 
extent of  impact of  the relevant design constraints, 99 Arnold J’s choice of  interpretation of  the exclusion 
for designs ‘dictated solely by… function’ at Articles 7(1) DD / 8(1) CDR adopts the more encompassing 
of  the two possible interpretations of  this provision, endorsing a legal test which has been said by some 
to re-introduce an aesthetic requirement into entitlement to protection. 100 In addition, a broad range of  
factors were taken into account as design constraints, not just the ‘features imposed by the technical 
function of  the product’ or ‘statutory requirements’ referred to in the passage quoted from Grupo Promer 
above. Relatively little also was said relating the particular design features relied upon by Dyson to the 
existing design corpus which, given the accepted striking novelty of  the Dyson design, was the key 
counterbalance to the courts’ findings on design freedom. 101  
Of  course, Dyson may yet become the prevailing European approach on the Article 7(1)/8(1) exclusion 
and on the range of  relevant design constraints. 102 Samsung reinforces Dyson on the former and does little 
to help settle the outstanding questions on the latter. On any view, however, the Dyson approach to design 
freedom is problematic. Taking the judgment of  the Court of  Appeal at face value and to its logical 
extreme, to hold that it is sufficient for design features to be significantly reduced in importance in the 
assessment of  overall impression simply if  there is a ‘technical reason’ for those features would, in effect, 
deny all but ornamental designs any meaningful protection.103 Setting the bar so low would wrongly result 
in functionally-influenced design features effectively being ignored in the infringement comparison.104 
Examining the judgments closely, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that Dyson is a case where the courts’ 
willingness to dismiss from the infringement analysis the functional-influenced elements of  Dyson’s 
design to some degree penalised design work which had identified an ‘optimal’ balance of  form and 
function.  Despite the Court of  Appeal’s rejection of  criticism to this effect, it does appear that Arnold J 
14 
was indeed concerned to keep free the ‘best technical compromise’ or ‘best solution’ at least in relation to 
some aspects of  the Dyson design, swayed by Vax’s submission that ‘the freedom of  the designer referred 
to in Article 9(2) is not the freedom to develop a technically inferior product’.105  This is despite the 
argument that, as noted in the early literature, ‘optimal designs’ are arguably: 
‘exactly the fusion of  function and appeal that the Commission intended to protect’.106 
Almost all design activity involves a process of  compromise and optimisation.107  It can also be difficult, 
if  not impossible, to differentiate between functional and non-functional elements of  a design.108 From a 
design industry perspective, the modern view of  design emphasises the importance of  the combination 
of  function and style, aiming for the optimal interrelationship between function and form.109  This 
renders even harder the drawing of  distinctions between functionality and aesthetics, described by one 
commentator as an ‘implausible, and impossible, task’.110 In dismissing so readily the functionally-
influenced elements of  the disputed design, and in doing so in a manner which appears to suggest an 
unrealistically clear demarcation between the functional and non-functional, Dyson risks undermining the 
ethos and innovation of  the European regime’s ‘design approach’.111  
In contrast, in Samsung Judge Birss’ judgment probes and analyses ‘design freedom’ in a manner much 
more aligned with the General Court’s rulings and Advocate-General’s comments on this issue. Like 
Dyson, Samsung is a case in which, at the end of  the day, matters of  visual appearance were key to the 
finding of  non-infringement and the relationship of  Apple’s design to existing design corpus, discussed in 
much more detail in Samsung than in Dyson, was critical.112  However, the different approach taken by 
Judge Birss on the issue of  ‘design freedom’ is also important. In Samsung, for each design feature in suit 
the judge assessed both the degree of  design constraint and, conversely, the degree of  aesthetic freedom 
remaining open to a designer in deciding what the impact of  each design constraint actually was. The net 
effect of  such an approach is that a greater degree of  design constraint, and a causal link between 
constraint and design, are required before overall impression is affected. Functionally-influenced design 
features are less readily dismissed from the assessment of  overall impression; instead, the complexities of  
the design process, the continual compromises in the exercise of  design choice and the inter-relationship 
of  functional and aesthetic factors underlying design features are all recognised with much more nuance.   
Although the Court of  Appeal addressed ‘design freedom’ in much more substantive detail in its earlier 
judgment in Dyson, it is submitted that the first instance approach to ‘design freedom’ in Samsung should 
be the preferred model for future cases given its greater alignment with EU-level authorities. Although 
the Court of  Appeal did not explicitly remark on the difference in Judge Birss’ analysis compared to 
Dyson, it is submitted that the Court of  Appeal’s unequivocal support for Judge Birss’ findings on ‘design 
freedom’ in Samsung should nonetheless be seen as an endorsement of  his approach going forward. 113  
Of  course, the Samsung case will no doubt continue to attract debate, particularly for its treatment of  the 
design corpus and the net effect of  the prior art on the scope of  protection afforded to Apple’s design. 
The case raises interesting questions as to how far more complicated or technical issues on ‘design 
freedom’ can be properly dealt with while at the same time assessing overall impression through the eyes 
of  the informed user. 114 Samsung also rather confounds the much-repeated mantra that designs cases 
must necessarily be simple ones.115  However, adopting the Samsung approach brings us much closer to 
ensuring that design infringement reflects design’s need for a ‘methodology of  its own’ reflecting that 
design is ‘neither a scientific process nor exactly art-like’, but a ‘mixture of  art and technology’.116  After 
the apparently backward shift in Dyson, Samsung goes a long way to restoring more balanced protection to 
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OHIM Third Board of  Appeal in Lindner Recyclingtech GmbH v Franssons Verkstäder AB [2010] E.C.D.R. 1. See 
also: Howell, C. ‘Trade marks, registered designs and the monopolisation of  functional shapes: a consideration of  Lego and 
Dyson’ E.I.P.R. 2011, 33(1), 60-62; and Finn, M. ‘Dyson fails to clean up’ C.I.P.A.J. 2010, 39(8), 473-475, pages 474-
475. The initial general consensus among commentators as the DD and CDR proceeded towards enactment and 
in the period after their coming into force had been that even purely functional designs were not excluded from 
protection provided that that particular design was not the only way of  achieving the desired function; if  there 
was at least one alternative design capable of  achieving the same function, the design was not excluded. This is 
the so-called ‘multiplicity-of-forms’ approach. See: Beier (note 8 above), pages 850-851 and 856; Horton (note 8 
above), page 54; Levin commentary, page 74, Phillips commentary, pages 84-91 and Franzosi commentary, page 
90 in Franzosi, M. et al European Design Protection (note 8 above); Dinwoodie (note 8 above), page 671 (although 
advocating a slightly different approach at page 674); Lahore, J. ‘The protection of  functional designs: the amended 
approach for a European Designs Directive’ I.P.Q. 1997, 1, 128-133, pages 128-130;  Scanlan and Gale (note 8 above), 
page 101; Koschtial (note 4 above), pages 308-309 (although Koschtial is critical of  this approach); Schlötelburg, 
M. ‘Design protection for technical products’ J.I.P.L.P. 2006, 1(10), 675-678, page 678.  This interpretation opens up 
protection for functional designs to a very wide degree and avoids having to address any question of  aesthetics. 
However, the ‘multiplicity-of-forms’ approach has been much criticised. The alternative interpretation of  this 
exclusion which is prevalent in the literature excludes from protection designs which are determined solely by 
functional considerations, where aesthetic considerations played no part in the design process. This mirrors the 
approach of  the House of  Lords to the old UK RDA 1949 in the pre-harmonisation case of  Amp Inc  v Utilux 
Pty Ltd [1972] R.P.C. 103. For comparison of  the two approaches, see: Scanlan and Gale (note 8 above), pages 
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98-103; Howe (note 2 above), paragraphs 2-025 to 2-030; Suthersanen, Design Law (note 1 above), paragraphs 6-
010 to 6-015; Laddie et al (note 2 above), paragraphs 54.28-54.31. The shift towards an Amp-style approach, 
marked by strong criticism of  the ‘multiplicity-of-forms’ analysis, in effect began in the decision of  the OHIM 
Third Board of  Appeal in Lindner and has the potential to exclude from protection a broader set of  functional 
designs.  In favouring the Lindner approach, in Dyson Arnold J departed from the earlier English Court of  Appeal 
judgment in Landor & Hawa International Ltd v Azure Ltd [2007] F.S.R. 9, which had adopted the multiplicity-of-
forms theory: Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 24-29. Arnold J’s ruling on this issue was not 
challenged on appeal and this interpretation of  Articles 7(1) DD / 8(1) CDR is now consolidating without 
further controversy in subsequent cases in the English courts: Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 
36-38 and Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraph 31; see also Louver-Lite Limited v Harris Parts Limited [2012] 
E.W.P.C.C. 53 (English Patents County Court, currently unreported), paragraph 10. It also seems to have become 
accepted at OHIM: see Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 38; A.C.V. Manufacturing NV v AIC SA 
[2012] E.C.D.R. 13, paragraph 15; Du Mont and Janis (note 14 above), page 32 and footnote 179. However, it 
remains to be seen whether this shift in approach will be followed in other jurisdictions: as noted by the OHIM 
Third Board of  Appeal and by commentators, many national courts and commentators have endorsed the 
‘multiplicity-of-forms’ approach and a reference to the Court of  Justice may be required to resolve the issue, see: 
Lindner and Du Mont and Janis (note 14 above), pages 29, 32 and 41, where it is the ‘multiplicity-of-forms’ 
approach which is described as ‘the dominant analytical standard’. 
34 It was held that the design of  the bin reflected a mixture of  both functional and aesthetic considerations: Dyson, 
High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 59. On the facts, this was always highly likely to have been the outcome 
whichever interpretation of  Article 7(1) DD was preferred: see Laddie et al (note 2 above) paragraph 54.30. 
35 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 65, 68, 72, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81 and 84. 
36 See: Finn (note 33 above), page 475. Although not made wholly clear, Arnold J appears to have accepted that the 
existence of  other intellectual property rights might be a relevant constraint, but on the facts this issue was not 
developed as Vax did not substantiate this element of  their case: Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 
63. After argument from the parties, Arnold J also developed from Grupo Promer a further refinement on how 
design constraints affect how a registered design should be viewed relative to the prior art: in particular, where 
particularly striking elements of  the registered design were ones in relation to which there was little design 
freedom, because of  that limited freedom those elements would not be considered to have the same high level 
of  impact on the informer user as they would otherwise have done: Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 
41; approved in Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 48-49.  
37 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 33-34 and 61-62. 
38 On the lower bin support and curved shape of  the handle, see Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 80 
and 82. 
39 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 65-66. 
40 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 69-70. 
41 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 72-73. 
42 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 75. 
43 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 77. 
44 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 78. 
45 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 79. 
46 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 84. 
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47 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 81. 
48 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 67 and 70 (in relation to the design of  the transparent bin), 71 
(design of  the cyclone visible through the transparent bin), 74 (design of  the rear wheels), 75 (appearance of  the 
rear wheel spacing), 77 (design of  the rear wheel arches), 78 (shape of  the operational pedals), 79 (shape of  the 
cyclone top), 80 (lower bin support), 83 (handle shape) and 84 (shape of  the body portion housing air ducts etc). 
49 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 85-91 (rear of  the machine, hose connector position, front wheels, 
cut-away base, footplate and wand handle). 
50 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 92-94. 
51 The Court of  Appeal could only reverse Arnold J’s judgment if  shown that he had erred in principle: Dyson, Court 
of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 16-17. 
52 Quoted from an exchange in court between Dyson’s counsel and Black LJ, reproduced in full by Sir Robin Jacob 
in Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 21-22. 
53 Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 22-24. There was only one point of  disagreement between the 
Court of  Appeal and Arnold J, on the question of  whether the design freedom to be taken into account in the 
infringement analysis was that of  the designer of  Dyson’s design or of  the ‘Mach Zen’. Sir Robin Jacob held that 
Arnold J should have addressed the former not the latter, but concluded that this made no difference on the 
facts as there was no evidence of  any change in design constraints in the period between the date of  Dyson’s 
registered design and the designing of  the ‘Mach Zen’: Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 18-20.  
54 Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 29-33. 
55As noted by the Court of  Appeal, the actual iPad is ‘quite a lot different’ to Apple’s Community design and was 
not itself  relevant to the infringement case: Samsung, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraph 4. 
56 These images are reproduced from the online version of  the Court of  Appeal’s judgment available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/1339.html&query=apple+and+samsung&method=boolean
. Images of  the other Samsung devices in suit can also be found at this link. 
57 See Samsung, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 5 and 55-63 for discussion of  the proceedings in other 
Member States and in the US. In the English litigation, Samsung applied for a declaration of  non-infringement 
in relation to its Galaxy tablet computers and Apple counterclaimed for infringement. Interim hearings before 
the English High Court and Court of  Appeal had addressed the relationship between the English litigation and 
the co-pending OHIM invalidity challenge under Article 91(1) CDR: see Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd and Another 
v Apple Inc (English High Court) [2013] F.S.R. 7 and (English Court of  Appeal) [2013] F.S.R. 8. After argument at 
the full trial and noting the agreement of  both sides to the counterclaim being heard and ruled upon, Judge Birss 
concluded that there were ‘special grounds’ within the meaning of  Article 91(1) not to stay the infringement 
counterclaim and proceeded to deal with the application for a declaration of  non-infringement and infringement 
counterclaim together: Samsung¸ High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 18-24. 
58  Samsung, High Court (note 5 above) paragraphs 36-38. This was endorsed on appeal: Samsung, Court of  Appeal 
(note 5 above) paragraph 31. See also note 33 above. 
59 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 16. 
60 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 42-47 and 67-71. Individual items of  prior art are discussed at 
paragraphs 72-91. Judge Birss endorsed the ruling of  Arnold J in Dyson to the effect that, although a design 
which is markedly different to the existing design corpus should normally be afforded a broad scope of  
protection, that may not be the case where a design is based on new technology which brings with it new design 
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constraints such that the comparison with the existing design corpus may have little relevance: Samsung, High 
Court (note 5 above), paragraph 49. 
61 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 39. 
62 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 40-41. In his subsequent judgment in Gimex International Groupe 
Import Export v The Chill Bag Company Limited and Others [2012] E.C.D.R. 25 (English Patents County Court) which 
was issued only a couple of  weeks later, Judge Birss adopted the Dyson approach that design freedom could be 
constrained by technical function, the need to incorporate features common to the products in question or 
economic considerations: paragraph 66. This was, however, common ground between the parties in Gimex: see 
paragraph 66. The Dyson approach has also been adopted in Mainetti (UK) Limited v Hangerlogic UK Limited [2012] 
E.W.P.C.C. 42 (English Patents County Court, currently unreported, paragraph 22), although without detailed 
substantive consideration of  the issue, and in Louver-Lite Limited v Harris Parts Limited [2012] E.W.P.C.C. 53 
(English Patents County Court, currently unreported, paragraph 11), but without a formal decision on the issue 
given the common ground in the submissions of  the parties.   
63 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 93-95. 
64 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 96-99. 
65 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 104. 
66 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 105-116. 
67 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 117-122. 
68 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 123-134. 
69 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 135-150. 
70 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 151-154. 
71 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 164-166. 
72 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 104, 116, 122, 134 and 150 in particular. 
73 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 163, 175 and 185-190. 
74 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 182 and 189-190. 
75 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 190-191. 
76 Samsung, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 10-24 (on the informed user’s perceptions) and paragraphs 
27-54 (on overall impression). 
77 Samsung, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraph 27. 
78 Samsung, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 28-54. 
79 Samsung, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 34-39 and 45-46.  
80 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 53-56. Although not articulated explicitly, in effect this is broadly 
the approach taken by Arnold J in his assessment of  overall impression, although with differences in his 
particular approach to the design corpus and design freedom which will be discussed further in the main body 
of  this article: Dyson, High Court, (note 5 above), paragraphs 64-94.  
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81 The Court of  Appeal emphasised in particular that overall impressions of  the designs were too different and 
Dyson’s case pleaded at too high a level of  generality for the claim to succeed Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 
above), paragraphs 29-33. See also: Daniels, M. and Parsons, G. ‘Vax found not to infringe Dyson’s registered design’ 
I.P.M. 2011/12, Dec/Jan, 91-92, page 92. 
82 Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraph 22. 
83 Arnold J uses the words ‘to that extent’ in two instances in relation to design freedom, first as regards the angle of  
the transparent bin (Dyson, High Court, note 5 above, paragraph 65) and second in relation to the spacing apart 
of  the wheels (Dyson, High Court, note 5 above, paragraph 75). However, these words are not expanded upon 
any further by him. 
84 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 48. On the limited nature and extent of  the evidence before the 
court and the very short time period in which the case was heard, see Finn (note 33 above), page 474. 
85 See Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraph 30, where Sir Robin Jacob notes that: ‘You cannot take the 
features of  a design, turn them into general words and then treat those words like a patent claim’. 
86 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 65. 
87 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 72 and 75.  
88 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 79. There is also no discussion of  the extent of  the restrictions said 
to impact on the design of  the wheel arches or handle: Dyson, High Court (note 5 above) paragraphs 76-78 and 
81. 
89 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 65, 69, 72, 75, 78 and 84. 
90 Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 23-24. 
91 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 64, quoting from Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), footnote 
69 above. 
92 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 64. 
93 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 64. 
94 Samsung, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 104, 116, 122 and 134 in particular on the extent to which design 
constraints could be said to ‘account for’ the similarity or identity between the Apple design and Samsung 
devices. 
95 Relevant constraints are also described by the General Court as ones which the designer ‘had to’ take into account: 
Grupo Promer, General Court (note 20 above), paragraphs 67-70. 
96 PepsiCo Inc (note 20 above), paragraphs AG29 and AG32. The Advocate-General also described the General 
Court’s view as being one in which ‘the constraints on creative freedom to be taken into consideration… are 
exclusively those which are dictated by the need for the goods to fulfil a certain function’ and that standard features 
which the market expects but which are not ‘technically necessary’ are not relevant constraints for these purposes 
with ‘mere market expectation’ not being relevant: paragraphs AG31-AG32 (emphasis added). The element of  
compulsion in the language used by the Advocate-General in Grupo Promer is emphasised in Du Mont and Janis 
(note 14 above), page 35.  
97 Shenzhen, paragraph 54; Kwang Yang Motor Co, Ltd v OHIM and Honda Giken Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (General Court, 
Case T-10/08) [2012] E.C.D.R. 2, paragraphs 32-37; Kwang Yang Motor Co, Ltd v OHIM and Honda Giken Kogyo 
Kabushiki Kaisha (General Court, Case T-11/08, currently unreported), paragraphs 32-37; Industrias Francisco Ivars, 
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SL v OHIM and Motive Srl (General Court, Case T-246/10, currently unreported), paragraph 22 (all note 20 
above). 
98 Shenzhen (note 20 above), paragraph 54: ‘[T]hose restrictions concern the presence of  certain features in the 
conference unit, but do not have a significant impact on their configuration and, therefore, on the form and 
general appearance of  the conference unit itself ’. See also Sphere Time, paragraph 69 and Kwang Yang Motor Co, 
Ltd, paragraph 36, both note 20 above. 
99 The broad-brush nature of  the courts’ approach to this issue is reinforced by comments on the nature of  the 
expert evidence relevant to Article 9(2) DD, which are described as relating, on technical matters, typically to 
‘why a thing or part of  a thing must be shaped at least broadly in a particular way so as to perform its function’: 
Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraph 13, emphasis added. 
100 Suthersanen, Design Law (note 1 above), paragraph 6-015, commenting on the OHIM Third Board of  Appeal in 
Lindner (note 33 above) and noting the conflict with the explanation in Recital 10 CDR and Recital 14 DD that, 
while technological innovation should not be hampered by granting design protection to features dictated solely 
by a technical function, ‘it is understood that this does not entail that a design must have an aesthetic quality’. As 
explained in note 33 above, Lindner was extensively quoted and applied by Arnold J in Dyson. In Lindner, the 
OHIM Third Board of  Appeal stressed that it did not see its interpretation of  the exclusion as ‘tantamount to 
introducing a requirement of  aesthetic merit into the legislation’: paragraph 35. However, Suthersanen questions 
whether there is really any difference between a requirement of  ‘aesthetic merit’ and, per Lindner, requiring that 
‘aesthetic considerations’ play some part in the design process. For further criticism of  the Lindner approach and 
its apparent revival of  ‘the dubious distinction’ between functional and aesthetic design innovation, see Du Mont 
and Janis (note 14 above), pages 31-32. 
101 It was held in general terms that the Dyson design was strikingly different to the existing design corpus and this 
was taken into account in the conclusion on overall impression: Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraph 94. 
However, in the detailed comparison of  design features the existing design corpus is specifically mentioned only 
in relation to the bin, operational buttons and longitudinal handle: Dyson, High Court (note 5 above), paragraphs 
70, 78 and 82. The Court of  Appeal rejected the argument that the striking nature of  the Dyson design had not 
been properly taken into account: Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above), paragraphs 26-33. 
102 See the arguments for and against the competing interpretations of  the Article 7(1)/8(1) exclusion in the 
literature and case law cited at note 33 above. As regards the type of  matters which may be treated as relevant 
design constraints, Dyson is explicable as a result of  the rather unclear net effect of  the General Court ruling in 
Grupo Promer. The Advocate-General in Grupo Promer took the view that ‘the constraints on creative freedom to 
be taken into consideration… are exclusively those constraints which are dictated by the need for the goods to 
fulfil a certain function’ and that the General Court had espoused that position (note 20 above, paragraph AG31) 
with any ‘“standard” features which the market expects but which are not technically necessary’ not relevant to 
design freedom. This seems, however, a rather wishful reading of  the General Court’s judgment in Grupo Promer 
given the General Court’s apparent approval of  the OHIM Board of  Appeal’s consideration of  matters such as 
cost, fitness for purpose (in that case, as a promotional item) and market acceptability as relevant factors for the 
purpose of  this assessment: Grupo Promer (note 20 above) paragraphs 68-70. These matters were not addressed in 
the appeal to the Court of  Justice and a number of  commentators have expressed disappointment that the 
Court of  Justice did not take the opportunity to clarify this issue: Marrell, M. ‘CJEU Defines “Informed User” 
Concept in Pepsi Registered Community Design Dispute’ W.I.P.R. 2011, 25(11), 40-41, page 41; Crompton, S. ‘Big boost for 
design rights in Europe’ M.I.P. 2011, 214, 6-7, quotation at page 7. In the meantime, see also note 62 above for the 
contrasting positions taken by Judge Birss in Samsung and Gimex International Groupe Import Export v The Chill Bag 
Company Limited and Others [2012] E.C.D.R. 25, and the positions also adopted in Mainetti (UK) Limited v 
Hangerlogic UK Limited [2012] E.W.P.C.C. 42 (English Patents County Court, currently unreported) and Louver-Lite 
Limited v Harris Parts Limited [2012] E.W.P.C.C. 53 (English Patents County Court, currently unreported), showing 
the present uncertainty even in UK case law. 
103 Dyson, Court of  Appeal (note 5 above) paragraph 23. 
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104 As noted by commentators, ‘the degree of  freedom enquiry speaks in terms of  relative weight; it does not call for 
features to be factored out altogether so as to render the design invisible’: Du Mont and Janis (note 14 above), 
page 37. 
105 Dyson, High Court (note 5 above) paragraphs 61, 65-66 and 69-70; Court of  Appeal (note 5 above) paragraph 22. 
Dyson has attracted comment for the limited protection which it appeared to afford to design right holders: 
Wilkie, E. ‘Design Wars – Dyson v Vax’ I.P.M. 2010, Oct, 55-56 (on the decision of  the English High Court); 
Daniels and Parsons (note 81 above, on the decision of  the English Court of  Appeal) noting that the appeal 
judgment does nothing to change the level of  complexity surrounding design law and that this case ‘clearly 
demonstrates’ that ‘businesses should not expect too much from their registered designs’ (page 92); Smith, C. 
and Fowler, C. ‘Greater clarity means designs deserve a second look’ M.I.P. 2011/12, 215, 30-33, page 30, commenting 
that the courts appeared ‘reluctant’ to ‘find a registered design infringed too readily’. In France, in litigation 
based on the same design the ‘Mach Zen’ was found to infringe: Smith and Fowler, page 32. 
106 Musker (note 8 above), paragraph 1-077. Musker notes that, provided infringers have a choice of  alternative 
design which does the same thing (albeit less well), the public are not deprived of  the benefits of  competition: 
paragraph 1-077. 
107 Musker (note 8 above) paragraph 1-077, noting that in many cases no feature of  a design is absolutely essential 
and deviation may be tolerated if  other parameters are varied: an optimal shape may be able to tolerate 
substantial deviations with some acceptable loss of  advantage. 
108 This distinction has been described as ‘illusory’ and ‘largely arbitrary’, see respectively: Dinwoodie (note 8 above), 
page 617; Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Community Design (note 4 
above), Explanatory Memorandum, impact commentary at pages 110-112. See also: Levin commentary, page 73 
(‘Function is part of  the aesthetic appearance, and it is very difficult to draw a borderline between what is 
aesthetical and what is functional’) in Franzosi, M. et al European Design Protection (note 8 above); Fischman Afori, 
O. ‘The Role of  the Non-Functionality Requirement in Design Law’ 20 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 847 
(2009-2010), page 848; Kingsbury (note 1 above), page 388. 
109 The ‘intent and purpose of  modern design [lies] in the very combination of  product aesthetics and optimum 
functional design’: Max Planck Institute ‘Towards a European Design Law’ 58, quoted in Du Mont and Janis (note 
14 above), page 26, footnote 141. See also: Green Paper (note 3 above), paragraph 5.4.1 (‘[M]odern industrial 
design tends… to have the most intimate merger of  functionalism and aesthetic value as its purpose’); Kur (note 
8 above), page 376; Dinwoodie (note 8 above), page 650; Franzosi ‘Design protection Italian style’ (note 11 above), 
page 599; Schlötelburg (note 33 above), page 675. As noted by the OHIM Third Board of  Appeal, the 
importance of  combining functional and aesthetic elements exists even for large items of  industrial equipment: 
see Lindner (note 33 above) paragraph 33. 
110 Suthersanen, Design Law (note 1 above) paragraph 13-001. 
111 Comments made in early literature in the context of  discussion on the interpretation of  the exclusion from 
protection for designs ‘dictated solely by… function’ are instructive: ‘The mere fact that a design is influenced by 
functional considerations should not disqualify it from protection. Otherwise, the innovation of  these proposals 
-- the elimination of  the threshold distinction between aesthetics and function – will prove illusory and 
functionalist design will remain excluded from protection’: Dinwoodie (note 8 above), pages 670-671. 
112 It was expressly noted by Judge Birss that Samsung highlighted the importance of  properly taking into account the 
design corpus when forming a view of  the overall impression created by a design: Samsung, High Court (note 5 
above), paragraph 189. See also: Clark, S. ‘Too cool for law school?’ I.P.M. 2012, Sep, 72-73, page 73 commenting that 
the outcome of  the case seems less surprising when the full factual picture regarding the existing design corpus 
and similarities/differences between the designs is understood, particularly when the simplicity of  Apple’s 
Community design is taken into account, it being harder to distinguish such a simple design from the prior art 
and any differences in the alleged infringement also being more noticeable.  
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113 There was no major discussion of  Judge Birss’ approach to ‘design freedom’ in the Court of  Appeal judgment as 
the principal focus of  the appeal was on Judge Birss’ approach to the design corpus and an alleged failure 
properly to have considered the designs as a whole. This was rejected by the Court of  Appeal: Samsung, Court of  
Appeal (note 5 above) paragraphs 27-54. Within that, as noted in the main body of  this article, all of  Judge Birss’ 
findings on ‘design freedom’ were upheld: Samsung, Court of  Appeal (notes 5 and 79 above), paragraphs 34-39 
and 45-46. 
114 According to the General Court and Court of  Justice, the informed user is not a technical expert: Grupo Promer 
(Court of  Justice, note 20 above) paragraph 59; see also Shenzhen (General Court, note 20 above), paragraph 48: 
the qualifier ‘informed’ ‘does not imply that the informed user is able to distinguish, beyond the experience 
gained from using the product concerned, the aspects of  appearance of  the product which are dictated by the 
product’s technical function from those which are arbitrary’ (followed in Kwang Yang Motor Co, Ltd v OHIM and 
Honda Giken Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Case T-10/08, 9 September 2011, [2012] ECDR 2), paragraphs 26-27; Kwang 
Yang Motor Co, Ltd v OHIM and Honda Giken Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Case T-11/08, 9 September 2011, currently 
unreported) paragraphs 26-27; Industrias Francisco Ivars, SL v OHIM and Motive Srl (Case T-246/10), paragraph 16 
(all note 20). As noted in the early literature, the degree of  design freedom and the informed user’s perception 
of  the degree of  design freedom may not be the same, see: Musker (note 8), paragraph 1-053, in which it is 
noted that ‘it seems that one is intended to base the test on what the informed user assumes about the level of  
design freedom available to the designer’. Musker describes the adoption of  the position that the informed user 
knows about design freedom in the relevant sector as a ‘pretty artificial’ legal fiction: paragraph 1-055.  It has 
been suggested that users will ‘only rarely’ have a true idea of  the freedom available to the designer; unless the 
informed user is deemed to be informed of  design constraints to the level of  an actual designer, if  to be 
assessed through the informed user’s eyes then the concept of  design freedom should more properly be 
characterised as ‘apparent design freedom’ instead: Musker (note 8), paragraphs 1-055 and 1-057. 
115 It has been noted that Samsung v Apple suggests that, in order to judge the scope of  a [design], it will be ‘necessary 
as a matter of  course, and not only as an exceptional matter’ to adduce evidence of  the design corpus and expert 
evidence on design freedom as an ‘essential step’ in educating the judge into an informed user: Smyth, D. 
‘Samsung v Apple: How does the judge become an ‘informed user’?’ J.I.P.L.P. 2012, 7(11), 776-778.  
116 Fischman Afori (note 1 above) page 1144. 
